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ABSTRACT
Food safety has been a critical concern worldwide. The World
Health Organization finds that harmful food causes more than 200
diseases, contributing to the death of 420,000 people globally
every year. Nevertheless, prosecution for manslaughter by unsafe
food remains largely unfamiliar. Recently, two English cases
have set examples of such prosecutions, providing useful
guidance for common law jurisdictions. Following a comparative
method, this article analyzes the existing laws governing
criminally negligent manslaughter in England, Australia,
Bangladesh and India and examines their applicability to deaths
caused by food. It finds that although there is a notable similarity
between the laws of England and Australia, the statutory laws of
Bangladesh and India have significant deficiencies, which can
potentially be remedied through the incorporation of common law
principles. This article provides specific recommendations based
on its findings aimed at preventing food offenses through the
adoption of a deterrence-based approach. As such, the
recommendations can also benefit other common law countries.
Keywords: Unsafe food, manslaughter, England, Australia,
Bangladesh, India
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I. Introduction
Food safety is indispensable for everyone living anywhere in the
world, simply because food1 is naturally a primary need of all life
in order to survive. The World Health Organization (“WHO”)
underscores that “certainly everyone has to die of something, but
death does not need to be slow, painful, or premature”─ especially
as a result of consuming unsafe foods.2 Adulterated or unsafe foods
can kill consumers instantly or slowly, in most instances without
being able to diagnose the true cause of one’s early demise—
especially in developing countries. As consumers, we are mostly
reliant on others to produce, manufacture, supply, or prepare food
for us; however, we are generally unable to guard against illicit
activities surrounding our meals from farm to fork in real life.
Usually, profit-driven businesses (and sometimes greedy farmers)
knowingly, unknowingly, or negligently transform our food from
lifesaver to killer through contamination,3 contributing to
immediate death or causing incurable diseases leading to potential
death or enduring impairment. To cater to the taste of contemporary
eaters, even the most natural of foods such as grapes have been an
object of engineering design, which accords to the fact that the
“modern diet is killing us.”4 Killing people by food frauds5 is now
recognized as a serious crime of homicide,6 known as gross
* I am grateful to Dr Mathew Leighton-Daly, School of Law, University of Wollongong,
Australia, for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 The word “food,” as used in this article, is inclusive of all food, drinks, beverages,
fruits, etc.
2 World Health Organization, Preventing Chronic Diseases: A Vital Investment,
WHO 1, 9 (2005), https://www.who.int/chp/chronic_disease_report/contents/foreword.
pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/9DMR-B2WN].
3 Though technically different, “adulteration” and “contamination” are used
interchangeably in this article.
4 Bee Wilson, Good Enough to Eat? The Toxic Truth about Modern Food, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/mar/16/snackattacks-the-toxic-truth-about-the-way-we-eat [https://perma.cc/SD6E-ZV6W].
5 No single legal definition of food frauds exists. See Aline Wisniewski & Anja
Buschulte, Dealing with Food Fraud: Part 1, 14 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 6, 6 (2019).
However, “food frauds,” for the purposes of this article, include all sorts of willful or
negligent biological, physical, chemical adulteration and contamination or mislabeling of
foods, drinks and beverage for increasing financial benefit, not intending to cause injury
or death of anyone.
6 See, e.g., R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 (UK); Kuddus v. R [2019]
EWCA (Crim) 837 (UK).
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negligence manslaughter or manslaughter by criminal negligence
(“MCN”). We may also call it “food manslaughter” or manslaughter
by unsafe food. Noting the seriousness of manslaughter caused by
unsafe food, Lord Hickinbottom observed in the first ever British
conviction of food manslaughter of a restauranteur in R v. Zaman
that the trader’s behavior, “driven by money, was appalling.”7
The food industry is growing rapidly across the globe,8 and,
correspondingly, human food has been a greater cause of disease
and death around the world compared to the harm inflicted by
tobacco or alcohol.9 Alarmingly, WHO finds that unsafe food
containing harmful elements such as bacteria, viruses, parasites or
chemical substances causes more than 200 diseases, spanning from
diarrhea to cancers, resulting in death of 420,000 people worldwide
every year.10 It is obvious in the context of health and safety that
deaths caused by adulterated foods are directly perpetrated, rather
than consequences of tragic accidents.11 In most cases, we remain
unaware that we consume poisonous foods that kill us slowly, such
as the often latently contaminated meat that we eat. One aspect of
poisoning meats is antimicrobial resistance (“AMR”)12 caused by
excessive use of medically important antimicrobials (“MIA”) on
meat producing animals (“MPA”) with the intention of artificially
fattening MPA for merely economic gain.13 The extent of AMR
health effects is probably best illustrated in the 2019 Report of the

7

R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [81] (UK).

John Spink ET AL., International Survey of Food Fraud and Related Terminology:
Preliminary Results and Discussion, 84 J. FOOD SCIS. 2705, 2705 (2019).
9 Wilson, supra note 4.
8

World Health Organization, Food Safety, WHO 1, 1 (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/food-safety [https://perma.cc/K2B2UYJD].
11 See Sophie Hofford, Corporate Homicide/Manslaughter; Symbolic or Purely
Instrumental, 9 ABERDEEN STUDENT L. REV. 37, 50 (2019).
12 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the
United States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. 107 (2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P9Q7ACA] (finding that the AMR has been defined as “the result of microorganisms changing
in ways that reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of drugs, chemicals, or other agents used
to cure or prevent infections.”).
13 See generally Abu Noman Mohammad Atahar Ali & S. M. Solaiman, Dishonest
and Excessive Use of Antibiotics in Meat Producing Animals in Bangladesh: A Regulatory
Review, 15 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 449 (2020).
10
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United Nations Interagency Coordination Group (“IACG”) on
Antimicrobial Resistance, which reveals that AMR will cause an
estimated ten million deaths worldwide each year by 2050.14
The situation in Bangladesh seems dreadful. Bangabandhu
Sheikh Mujib Medical University (“BSMMU”), the country’s
oldest medical university, reports that around eighty percent of
deaths occurring in the intensive care unit of its hospital are caused
by bacterial or fungal infections which could not be cured, due to
the micro-organism’s insensitivity towards antibiotics.15 The report
adds that AMR contributes to seventy percent of total deaths across
all intensive care units in Bangladesh.16 Additionally, cancer has
been an increasingly prominent cause of premature deaths in
Bangladesh,17 and such death rates are predicted to rise from seven
and a half percent in 2005 to thirteen percent in 2030.18 It is widely
believed that the widespread cancer is a result of rampant food
adulteration.19 The situation is so severe that the President of
Bangladesh asserted last year in a public speech that formalin—
poison used to keep food looking fresh—is mixed with all
foodstuffs in the country, killing thousands of people, so those who
adulterate food commit “genocide.”20 Likewise, the Food Minister
of the country branded adulterators in 2019 as the “enemies of the
14 World Health Organization, No Time to Wait: Securing the Future from DrugResistant Infections: Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, WHO 1, 5
(Apr. 2019), https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/interagency-coordinationgroup/IACG_final_report_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/44J5-TACU].
15 See Ali & Solaiman, supra note 13.
16

Id. at 455.

17 Jannatol Ferdous ET AL., A Study of Relationship between Dietary Habits and
Cancer Patients Status in a Bangladeshi Population, 9 INT’L J. HEALTH SCIS. & RES. 22, 22
(2019).
18 Id.
19 See S.M. Solaiman, & Abu Noman Mohammad Atahar Ali, Rampant Food
Adulteration in Bangladesh: Gross Violations of Fundamental Human Rights with
Impunity, 14(1-2) ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L. 29 (2013); S.M. Solaiman & Abu Noman
Mohammad Atahar Ali, Extensive Food Adulteration in Bangladesh: A Violation of
Fundamental Human Rights and State’s Binding Obligations 49 J. ASIAN AFR. STUD. 617
(2014). See also M.A. Hakim ET AL., Role of Health Hazardous Ethephone in Nutritive
Values of Selected Pineapple, Banana and Tomato, 10(2) J FOOD AGRIC. ENVIRON. 247,
(2012).
20 Salam Mashroor & Hossain Imran, Those Who Mix Formalin in Food Commit
Genocide, DAILY JANAKANTHA 1, 1 (Jan. 9, 2020) (Bangl.); Bangla Tribune Desk, Use of
Formalin Will Paralyse Nation: President, BANGLA TRIBUNE (Bangl.) (Jan. 8, 2020).
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nation” and termed food adulteration a “crime against humanity.’”21
The country’s Supreme Court was consistent with the trend, and in
2019 observed that “if necessary, the state may declare an
emergency for preventing food adulteration” and also urged the
Prime Minister to declare war on the menace of this abomination.22
Without repeating facts and figures, we assert that the food safety
scenario in India is comparable with that in Bangladesh.23
Apart from adulteration, food labeling is also very important.
Food allergies have been an increasingly prevalent health problem
across the world, and people die or become seriously sick due to
defective and poor labeling or consumer lack of awareness of food
ingredients.24 About ten people die every year in the United
Kingdom (“UK”) alone due to food related anaphylaxis,25 and the
mortality from harmful foods has been on the rise due to the
negligence of traders over the past two decades in both Australia
and the United Kingdom.26
Hence, food adulteration or
contamination, and mislabeling or hiding the actual ingredients
from consumers, are all frightful human conduct, which should be
adequately penalized to protect people through deterrence.
Refraining from delving into the debate of effectiveness of the
deterrence theory of punishment, we support the widely accepted
view that punishment creates deterrence.27
21 Pearly Neo, ‘Enemies of the Nation’: Bangladesh Considers Death Penalty, Life
Imprisonment for Food Adulterators, FOOD NAVIGATOR-ASIA.COM (June 11, 2019, 1:51
AM), https://www.foodnavigator-asia.com/Article/2019/06/11/Enemies-of-the-nationBangladesh-considers-death-penalty-life-imprisonment-for-food-adulterators
[https://perma.cc/59AJ-BPJ6].
22 Shihab Sarkar, Dealing with Food Adulteration Menace, FIN. EXPRESS (Bangl.),
May 20, 2019, at Views; Ashutosh Sarkar, 52 Food Items: Most of Them Now Pass BSTI
Retest, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jun. 11, 2019, at back page.
23 See Zuzana Smeets Kristkova ET AL., The Economics of Food Safety in India – A
Rapid
Assessment,
(Nov.
2017),
https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle
/10568/89203/Economics%20food%20safety%20India.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FKE8VNV]; R. V. Sudershan ET AL., Foodborne Infections and Intoxications in Hyderabad
India, EPIDEMIOLOGY RES. INT’L 1, 1 (2014).
24 M. Hazel Gowland & Michael J. Walker, Food Allergy, A Summary of Eight Cases
in the UK Criminal and Civil Courts: Effective Last Resort for Vulnerable Consumers?,
95 J. SCI. FOOD & AGRIC. 1979, 1979 (2015).
25 Id.
26 R. J. Mullins ET AL., Increases in Anaphylaxis Fatalities in Australia from 1997 to
2013, 46 CLIN. EXP. ALLERGY 1099, 1099 (2016).
27 See, e.g., Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S. Koper, Deterring Corporate Crime,
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This article seeks to compare and contrast the laws concerning
criminal liability of natural persons (excluding artificial persons) for
homicides caused by unsafe food in the United Kingdom, Australia,
Bangladesh and India, with a view to making suggestions for
improvement of the relevant laws of the latter two in light of the
corresponding laws of the former two jurisdictions. Notably, the
laws of New South Wales (“NSW”), Australia, and that of England,
the United Kingdom will be considered in this endeavor for
appraising their equivalents in Bangladesh and India. It is
worthwhile to mention that common law governs unintentional
homicides by natural persons in both England and NSW,28 whilst
the Penal Code 1860 inherited from the British colonial regime
applies to MCN in both Bangladesh and India as their primary
criminal legislation. India calls it Indian Penal Code 1860
(“IPC1860”), while in Bangladesh it is known as the Bangladesh
Penal Code 1860 (“BPC1860”). This article, therefore, intends to
analyze solely criminal law provisions, putting aside the regulatory
offenses under food safety legislation. We would advocate
harmonization of food-manslaughter laws amongst the selected four
jurisdictions.29
Discussions are broken down into five sections. Section 2,
which follows this introduction, presents the origins of the modern
law of negligence and its applicability to MCN, whilst Section 3
discusses application of the law of MCN to deaths caused by food.
Section 4 analyzes the elements of MCN, and Section 5 considers
punishments available for MCN in the selected four jurisdictions.
Section 6 concludes this article with its major recommendations.

30 CRIMINOLOGY 347, 349 (1992). For the debate, see also Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law, 170 (1977); Sylvia Rich, Corporate Criminals and Punishment Theory,
29 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 97 (2016); McGonigle v R [2020] NSWCCA 84 ¶¶ 78-79, 92 (Austl.);
Bates v R [2020] NSWCCA 259 ¶¶ 29, 32 (Austl.); Ellis v R [2020] NSWCCA 303 ¶¶ 30,
59 (Austl.); Hoskins v R [2020] NSWCCA 18 ¶ 64 (Austl.); Nauer v R [2020] NSWCCA
174 ¶ 85 (Austl.).
28 See R v. Adomako [1995] 1 AC (HL) 171 (UK), a leading case of House of Lords
on gross negligence manslaughter.
29 For the significance of convergence of food safety regulation, see Mengyi Wang
& Ching-Fu Lin, Towards a Bottom-up SPS Cooperation: An Analysis of Regulatory
Convergence in Food Safety Regimes, 8 TRADE L. & DEV. 117 (2016).
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II. Origins of the Modern Law of Negligence and its
Applicability to Manslaughter by Criminal Negligence
The law of negligence in England and consequently NSW can
be traced back to the late 19th century when Brett M.R. (Master of
the Rolls) in Heaven v. Pender mentioned in dicta that:
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a
position with regard to another that anyone of ordinary sense
who did think would at once recognize that, if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger.30
However, the modern law of negligence is widely believed to
have been founded on the common law “neighborhood principle”
enunciated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson in 1932.31 The
oft-quoted principle reads:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law,
you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s
question, Who is my neighbour? . . . You must take
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.
Who, then, in law is my neighbour? . . . persons who are so
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or
omissions which are called in question.32
The neighborhood principle was originally articulated in the
context of a civil claim. However, the House of Lords in R v.
Adomako affirmed its applicability to criminal negligence as well,
and held that the ordinary principles of the law of negligence
governing civil disputes apply to MCN in the determination of the
existence of duty and the breach thereof.33 More clearly, consistent
with the U.K. authorities,34 French CJ (Chief Justice) of the High

30

Heaven v. Pender [1883] All ER 35 at 39-40 (Eng.).

31

Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 562 (appeal taken from Scot.).

32

Id. at 580.

33

R v. Adomako [1995] 1 AC (HL) 171, 187B (UK).

Mitchell v. Glasgow City Council [2009] 3 All ER 205 at 893 (Scot.); R v. Miller
[1983] 2 AC (HL) 161, 179 (UK); R v. Evans (Gemma) [2009] EWCA (Crim) 650 (UK).
34
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Court of Australia (“HCA”) in Burns v. R clarified that “[a] duty of
care may also arise where a defendant has played a causative part in
the sequence of events which have given rise to the risk of injury,
such that ‘a duty to take reasonable steps to avert or lessen the risk
may arise.’”35 Therefore, the HCA applied the neighborhood
principle to MCN in Burns v. R.36 Simpson JA in R v. Moore
accordingly mentioned that “[t]he offence of manslaughter by gross
criminal negligence is derived from the tort of negligence, with an
additional important element,” which is grossness or wicked in
negligence.37 The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal (“NSWCCA”)
in this case cited the above quoted French CJ’s assertion 38 and
applied the neighborhood principle in NSW.
It is now clear that the neighborhood principle applies to MCN
in both England and NSW. However, the common law has not
developed in Bangladesh and India in line with its development in
England and NSW, perhaps mainly because the offense of negligent
killing was incorporated into the BPC1860 and IPC1860 in 1870.
Arguably, another reason could be the public ignorance or tolerance
of negligent conduct in general. For example, Justice Sharifuddin
Chaklader of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh (“HCD”) in Bangladesh Beverage Industries Ltd v.
Rowshan Akhter observed about the application of law to negligent
deaths in 2010 that:
This is a case on tortuous liability of a person. This law in
our country more or less is on book, not in practice. We have
seen in daily newspapers that on each day several accidents
took place causing death of passersby, passengers, driver but
either for ignorance of law or for some other purpose i.e.
‘since death has occurred what will do in getting
compensation,’ no one come forward for invoking this law
and since this law has not been practiced, as a result, we are
unable to protect the lives and properties of the citizens who
lost their lives in different types of accidents.39
35

Burns v The Queen (2012) HCA at 23; 290 ALR 713, 723 (Austl.).

36

Burns v The Queen (2012) 246 CLR 334 (Austl.).

37 R v Moore [2015] NSWCCA 316 ¶ 142 (Austl.). See also Nydam v R [1977] VR
430 (Austl.), which was adopted by the NSW prosecution culminating in the High Court
case, The Queen v. Lavender [2005] 222 CLR 67 (Austl.).
38 R v. Moore [2015] NSWCCA 316 ¶ 225 (Austl.).
39

Bangladesh Beverage Industries Ltd v. Rowshan Akhter, 62 DLR (HCD) 483, at
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His Honor added that “[i]f this law be practiced, then it is our
considered view that, at least, the death on accident may be
minimized. There are laws in our country but for mishandling of
law and sometimes misapplying of law for the benefit of the people
in helm of the country, not for the citizen, laws lost its
applicability.”40
However, claims of civil compensation for negligent deaths
have begun to come up, as evidenced in recent cases, for example,
Catherine Masud v. Md. Kashed Miah41 and CCB Foundation v.
Government of Bangladesh.42 Notably, there is no bar on pursuing
both civil and criminal cases against such deaths simultaneously.43
Criminal suits against MCN caused by unsafe food are yet to be
lodged with any courts in the country. We therefore argue that the
Supreme Court of Bangladesh would or should apply the
neighborhood principle in dealing with criminal cases involving
negligent deaths including food manslaughter. The following
discussion demonstrates application of laws of MCN to the deaths
caused by unsafe food.
III.

Application of the Law of MCN to Deaths Caused by
Food
The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act
2007 (UK) applies to business entities only, leaving natural persons
to be tried under the common law of manslaughter. This article is
concerned with the liability of individuals alone, putting the
legislation outside of its purview. However, a significant
development relating to individual liability occurred separately. For
example, the English Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in
Zaman44 convicted Mohammed Khalique Zaman (“Zaman”) of

[22] (2010) (Bangl.) (emphasis added).
40 Id. (emphasis added).
Catherine Masud v. Md. Kashed, 67 DLR (HCD) 527 (Transferred Misc. Case No.
01 OF 2016) (Judgment on 3 Dec. 3, 2017). (ordering that, in a motor accident causing
death, the defendant had to pay BDT46.2 million, approx. US$ 536,005).
42 5 CLR (HCD) 278 (2017) (Bangl.). The first ever public/constitutional tort case,
against the railway authority and fire service for the death of a four-year old boy who died
after falling into an uncovered deep shaft in the capital, the Court ordered to pay BDT 20
lakh (approx. US$23,203) as compensation to the victim’s parents.
43 See Masud, 67 DLR (HCD) 527.
41

44

R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 (UK).

2021 LAWS GOVERNING MANSLAUGHTER BY FOOD SAFETY CRIMES

85

MCN of Paul Wilson (“Wilson”) who had been suffering from a
severe peanut allergy since his childhood. Wilson visited Zaman’s
restaurant on January 30, 2014 and ordered a chicken tikka masala
takeaway. Wilson had clearly told the waiter who served him that
his meal must be free from peanuts. Accordingly, the waiter
specifically confirmed with Wilson at the time of serving the food
that the meal contained no nuts at all. Contrary to this assurance,
the sauce used in the meal contained a substantial number of
peanuts. Wilson ate the meal at his home and was found dead there
on the same day, following a terrible anaphylactic shock (allergic
reaction) triggered by the meal resulting in his death.45 Zaman was
prosecuted and charged with one count of gross negligence
manslaughter and six counts of contraventions of food safety
regulations. Zaman, a highly experienced restaurateur in England,
was sentenced to six years in prison, and he unsuccessfully appealed
against both his conviction and sentence.
Investigations found that in June 2013, Zaman started using
mixed nut powder comprised of wholly or mainly peanuts in replace
of almond powder in various dishes in a bid to save money. Zaman
admitted that at his restaurant, there were no relevant written
procedures or policies in respect of allergens, specifically “no
written recipes, no labelling of containers in the kitchen or
storeroom, and no system for recording the fact that each member
of staff understood the procedure and policy in relation to
allergens.”46 Officers from the Trading Standards Department who
visited the restaurant on the following day, January 31, 2014, found
peanut powder in different unmarked containers.47 The officers also
reported that a sample from an “unmarked tub containing sugar was
found to have significant peanut contaminant, sufficient to cause a
severe allergic reaction in an individual with an allergy to
peanuts . . . .”48 They also discovered “the chef using the same
spoon to take ingredients from different containers, which could and
would have resulted in mutual contamination.”49

45 Id. at 1; Tony Storey, Gross Negligence Manslaughter, Restaurant Owners and
the Duty of Care, 82 J. CRIM. L. 201, 201 (2018).
46 R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [28] (UK).
47

Id. at [19].

48

Id.

49

Id.
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A critical question in the case was about how Zaman’s
instructions were given and enforced to his staffers when serving
meals, especially to those customers who had explicitly informed
the relevant staff members of their pre-existing food allergy.50 The
prosecution argued that Zaman “took no steps to ensure the safety
of such customers, in that his staff were not trained, instructed or
supervised; or, if any training or instructions were given, no steps
were taken to ensure compliance by staff.”51 “As a result, the . . .
restaurant consistently served those who had declared a peanut
allergy with meals containing peanut.”52 The Crown case added that
Zaman had run several other restaurants and he had a history of
ignoring peanut allergy concerns,53 and that “the policies,
procedures, training and instruction, such as they were, were
incapable of ensuring a peanut-free meal was served.”54 Zaman
was informed a week before Wilson’s incident that “his internal
systems were defective and that steps had to be taken to protect such
customers in the future; but he had taken no steps by 30 January
2014.”55
Zaman claimed he did not breach his duty of care because he
was not present at the restaurant the evening the event occurred—
which was true—and further submitted that he imparted adequate
training and provided guidance to his restaurant staffers “who had
repeatedly failed to comply with their training and his clear and
strict instructions . . . as to how to deal with those who declared a
peanut allergy.”56 It was also true that Zaman never worked in that
restaurant’s kitchen, and certainly did not prepare Wilson’s food.57
Zaman contended that the trial judge misdirected the jury as to
the breach of duty and failed to direct the jury that the restaurant
chef’s negligence was the sole cause of the victim’s death. The
Court of Appeal rejected all his claims, dismissed the appeal in

50

Id. at [30].

51

R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [30] (UK).

52

Id.

53

Id. at [6].

54

Id. at [30].

55

Id.

56

Id. at [31]

57

R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [31] (UK).
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respect of both conviction and sentence, and therefore upheld the
decision of the trial court.58 Zaman is especially significant because
(1) Zaman is the first English case in which a restaurateur has been
convicted of MCN, and (2) because it establishes a precedent of
such conviction in recognition of restaurateur’s duty of care owed
to their customers for the United Kingdom as well as other common
law countries.59 Zaman sets out five specific common law elements
of MCN adopted from Adomako,60 which will be explored in this
piece.
The second recent English case is R v. Kuddus,61 in which the
MCN conviction of a restaurateur (the sole director of the
company), Mohammed Abdul Kuddus (“Kuddus”), was set aside
and the Court of Appeal acquitted him from the MCN charge
(though not the charges under food safety regulations). This
variation in judgments is attributed to the differences between the
facts of these two cases (Zaman and Kuddus). In Kuddus, the
defendant was the owner as well as a tandoori chef of the restaurant,
which operated a takeaway business in England.62 As stated in the
facts of the case, Megan Lee, along with one of her friends on
December 30, 2016, ordered a meal online via a third party website
in which her friend inserted the words “nuts and prawns” into the
comments section “because Megan had what was believed to be a
mild allergy to those potential ingredients.”63 The restaurant
received a printout of the order, but it was not brought to the notice
of Kuddus, who was working at that time as one of the chefs and
prepared part of the meal given to Megan.64
The food contained peanut proteins, which caused a severe
allergic reaction in Megan, causing her death in the hospital two
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R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [82] (UK).

Storey, supra note 45 at 203. See also Adam Withnall, Restaurant Owner
Convicted After Peanut Allergy Death, THE INDEPENDENT (DAILY EDITION) (UK), May 24,
2016, at 11; Michael E. Miller, Penny-Pinching Restaurant Owner Convicted of
Manslaughter for Serving Peanut-Tainted Tikka Masala to Man with Allergy, THE
WASHINGTON POST (U.S.), May 24, 2016, at Morning Mix.
60 R v. Adomako [1995] 1 AC (HL) 171, 187B-C (UK).
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days later.65 Kuddus was charged with MCN under common law,
as well as breaches of food safety regulations. The accused
(defendant and accused used interchangeably) contested the
manslaughter charge but conceded, however, other breaches of food
safety provisions. His argument was unsuccessful, and the trial
court convicted him of MCN and sentenced him to two years’
imprisonment for the offense of manslaughter, along with separate
penalties for other safety breaches.66 The manager of the business
(Rashid) was also convicted as co-accused on all three counts,
including MCN like Kuddus, and sentenced to three years’
imprisonment. Kuddus alone appealed against the conviction of
manslaughter on two grounds. First, Kuddus alleged that the trial
judge was wrong in refusing to direct the jury that they needed to
consider whether there was, in fact, a serious and obvious risk that
the appellant’s breach of duty would cause the death of specifically
this victim (as opposed to others more generally, who might be
suffering from peanut allergy), showing a distinction between the
foreseeability of risk and the existence of risk.67
The appellant submitted that the existence of risk in relation to
the victim was a matter of fact which the jury in this case should
have been directed to consider separately.68 Reasons argued in favor
of this ground were: (i) that the prosecution had to prove the factual
existence of serious and obvious risk of death concerning the victim,
and (ii) that it was contrary to logic and justice that a person could
be convicted on the basis that a reasonable person should have
foreseen a serious risk of death, unless that level of risk actually
existed.69 The appellant added that the required level of risk actually
did not exist.70
The appellant’s counsel further argued that the victim’s medical
history did not suggest anything in support of such a severe reaction
and added that the trial judge was “wholly illogical” in focusing on
“foreseeability rather than actuality of risk to the exclusion of the
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Id.
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R v. Kuddus [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [57] (UK).
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issue that the appellant sought to raise.”71 Furthermore, the
appellant’s counsel submitted that, “because the jury was not
directed as he had proposed, the factual existence of a serious risk
of death was implicitly assumed and was not effectively left to the
jury to decide” and reiterated that “the requisite serious and obvious
risk of death did not actually exist in the present case.”72
The second ground of appeal was that the trial judge, in her
directions to the jury, wrongly equated the declared allergy
knowledge of the business as a separate person, or of its manager
Rashid, who saw the note “nuts and prawns” inserted into the order
on behalf of the victim, to that of the owner, Kuddus. It means that,
since the victim declared “nuts, prawns” to the business, it
amounted to the knowledge of Kuddus on the basis that as owner he
was responsible for the whole system in the restaurant—even if the
declaration was made without the actual knowledge of the
appellant.73 The appellant’s counsel submitted that, regardless of
the propriety of imputing knowledge with respect to regulatory
offenses, such imputation was erroneous pertaining to MCN.74 The
counsel further truthfully argued that Kuddus was absolutely
unaware of the allergy declaration in question.75
In these circumstances, when viewed holistically, the Court of
Appeal held that the conviction for MCN cannot stand.76 The Court
allowed the appeal and quashed the MCN conviction based on the
ground that there was no evidence that Kuddus was informed of the
victim’s allergy declaration and that the direction to the jury on
attribution of knowledge renders his conviction unsafe.77 However,
the Court clarified that there was no requirement that a serious and
obvious risk of death of the specific person who died had to be
proved.78 Hence, the Court of Appeal rejected the first ground of
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appeal and accepted the second one.79
As the grounds for allowing the appeal and quashing the
conviction for MCN, the Court noted that the difficulty in the
approach taken by the trial judge was “that it was not suggested that
the appellant was armed with notice that Megan fell into the
category of those in respect of whom a reasonable person in the
position of the appellant could have foreseen an obvious and serious
risk of death by serving the food that he did.”80 The Court
underscored that Kuddus knew nothing of the allergy which the
victim had declared in the order. In those circumstances, the
conviction for MCN cannot stand.81 The Court further added that
Kuddus “spoke little English and had only taken over the restaurant
from Mr. Rashid the previous year in circumstances in which Mr.
Rashid continued to manage it.”82 The Court clarified that the
prosecution case against Kuddus “was based solely upon his failure
to introduce appropriate systems at a time when he knew nothing of
prospective customers’ allergies.”83 The Court further stated that
“there was no evidence that he was at any stage notified of Megan’s
allergy, the direction to the jury on attribution of knowledge renders
his conviction unsafe for the reasons we have given.”84 To avoid
any confusion, the Court noted that the responsibility of the owner
cannot be ignored simply by arguing that he/she was unaware of the
requirement of a specific order; rather, the owner can still be held
guilty of other offenses as Kuddus and the restaurant manager were
convicted for the same facts.85
By rejecting the first ground of appeal, the Court has defended
the common law principle that the duty of care need not be owed to
any particular person; instead, it would suffice if proved that the
victim who died was one of the class of people (e.g., nut allergy
sufferers) to whom the defendant owed a duty of care.86 The duty
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is to take reasonable care not to injure that class of people, and the
question to be answered is whether any proven breach would have
created a serious and obvious risk of death for any one of that class.
The objective foreseeability of the risk of a specific victim or the
existence of actual risk need not be proved in order to establish
breach of the duty. A critical point to note is that, to establish the
requirement of the foreseeable risk for the purposes of MCN, the
defendant needs to be “armed with notice that a particular customer
falls into the category or class, which the system (or statute) was
designed to deal with, a reasonable person in the position of the
restaurateur . . . would, at the time of breach of duty, have foreseen
an obvious and serious risk of death” of anyone of that class.87 It is
in those circumstances the required gross negligence can be
proved.88
This is in sharp contrast to Zaman who admitted that he knew
about the serious and obvious risk of death of people having nut
allergies if they eat the food they supplied to the victim in Zaman.
The existence of a duty of reasonable care still remains unaffected
after the decision in Kuddus, as it is owed to the class of people and
it is sufficient if the victim belongs to that class. Regarding
determination of the required foreseeability of risk, Sir Brian
Leveson, one of the most senior judges in England and Wales,
confirmed that:
the assessment of the foreseeability question is both objective[,]
i.e. determined according to a reasonable prudent person in the
shoes of the defendant and prospective, i.e. it is predicated on
the defendant’s actual knowledge at the time of the breach, and
not on knowledge that he or she could, or should, have had.”89
Both Zaman and Kuddus are British examples of selling food
which is unsafe for certain groups of people, whereas various food
items that may be unsafe for all consumers at large (i.e., adulterated,
contaminated, mislabeled, misbranded, etc.) are randomly sold by
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88

R v. Kuddus [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [80] (UK).
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restaurateurs in both Bangladesh90 and India.91
Following
reasonable inquiries by the authors, although regulatory actions are
sometimes taken against those wrongdoers by respective
authorities, there has been no record of MCN conviction in either of
the two countries so far as we know. This implies the relevance of
Zaman and Kuddus to Bangladesh and India even from a restaurant
perspective.
Some useful formulations for the elements of MCN in Zaman
and Kuddus are found in a food safety context. This work now
attempts to identify and analyze the elements of MCN under the
current laws in England and NSW alongside their equivalents in
Bangladesh and India in order to unravel the weaknesses inherent
in the latter two jurisdictions.
IV.

Elements of the Offense of Manslaughter by Criminal
Negligence
The elements of MCN under the recent common law of England
are similar, but not formulated in identical terms in all cases, as
mentioned by the Court of Appeal in Kuddus.92 Since this article is
concerned with food safety, we rely mainly on Kuddus and Zaman
and discuss the following five elements that the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt. The elements listed in Kuddus,
taken from Zaman, are:
(a) Existence of the duty of care: that the defendant owed an
existing duty of care to the victim as a member of the class
of people who might be “injured” by the defendant’s
conduct;
(b) Breach of the duty: that the defendant negligently
breached that duty of care;
(c) Reasonable foreseeability of risk: that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the breach of that duty gave rise to a serious
and obvious risk of death;
(d) Causation: that the breach of that duty caused the death
of the victim; and
See AK Mohiuddin, The Mysterious Domination of Food Contaminants and
Adulterants in Bangladesh 3 J. ENVIRON. SCI. PUB. HEALTH 34, 36 (2019).
91 Deepika Jayaram, How Safe is Restaurant Food?, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 18,
2018, at City; Rajulapudi Srinivas, 426 Cases Booked for ‘Selling Unsafe, Misbranded
Food Items, THE HINDUS, Mar. 1, 2020, at States.
92 R v. Kuddus [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [33]-[34] (UK).
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(e) Gross negligence: that the circumstances of the breach
were truly so exceptionally bad and reprehensible as to
justify the conclusion that it amounted to gross negligence
and requires criminal sanction.93
Each of these elements will be analyzed shortly below.
However, before doing that, we must consider these elements as
applied in NSW, followed by the corresponding requirements in
Bangladesh and India.
No NSW manslaughter case may be identified that directly
relates to food safety; however, there are cases of MCN caused by
different conduct that can be used as a general principle to breaches
of food safety prohibitions contributing to death, as applied in
England. NSW common law principles are greatly similar to those
of England and differ mainly on one point—the reasonably
foreseeable risk of GBH or death,94 unlike the English requirement
of foreseeable risk of “death” only. It makes the scope of the duty
wider in NSW.
Although the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (“CA1900”) contains the
definition of murder, it does not define manslaughter offenses at all,
leaving it to the judiciary.95 After defining murder, § 18 of the
CA1900 states that “[e]very other punishable homicide shall be
taken to be manslaughter.”96 Hence, in NSW, common law
determines and defines the elements of the offense of
manslaughter.97 As defined in Nydam v. R by the Supreme Court of
Victoria, which was later affirmed by the HCA, making it the
common law of Australia (to be discussed later), establishing MCN
requires the prosecution to prove that:
The act which caused the death was done by the accused
consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of
causing death or grievous bodily harm but in circumstances
which involved such a great falling short of the standard of
care which a reasonable man would have exercised and
which involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily
R v. Kuddus [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [34] (UK); R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA
(Crim) 1783 [24] (UK).
94 Nydam v R [1977] VR 430 ¶ 445 (Austl.).
93
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harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal
punishment.98
It is germane to mention that the English Court of Appeal, in the
leading case of MCN, R v. Bateman,99 formulated a similar set of
four elements. These elements were subsequently reaffirmed by the
House of Lords in Adomako.100 The four elements as directed by
the trial judge to the jury and later affirmed by the NSWCCA in R
v. Cittadini101 were adopted from Adomako, as follows:
(a) Existence of duty of care: that the accused owed a duty
of care to the deceased.
(b) Breach of duty of care by negligent conduct: that the
accused was negligent by breaching the duty of care by
his/her conduct (acts or omissions), meaning he/she did
something that a reasonable person in his/her position would
not do or he/she failed to do something that a reasonable
person in his/her position would have done.
(c) Grossly or wickedly negligent conduct: that the breach
of duty fell so far short of the standard of care that a
reasonable person in his/her position would have exercised,
and it involved such a risk of death or serious bodily harm
so as to constitute “gross” or “wicked” negligence, therefore
to be treated as criminal conduct.102
(d) Causation: that the conduct of the accused caused the
death of the deceased.
These four elements in NSW essentially mirror the aforesaid
five in England, with a difference in the foreseeable risk to satisfy
the grossness of criminal negligence, as mentioned earlier.
The Judicial Commission of NSW summarizes the common law
requirements of MCN, which are similar to those of the above four
with a better clarity that the accused conduct was “a substantial
cause of, or accelerated, the death of the victim,” and the disputed
conduct of the accused is criminally punishable because “(a) it fell
so far short of the standard of care which a reasonable person would
have exercised in the circumstances; and (b) it involved such a high
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risk that death or really serious bodily harm would follow” as a
result of such conduct.103
All of these four elements are to be established beyond
reasonable doubt in order to convict an accused of MCN in NSW.104
Both Bangladesh and India have identical statutory definition of
the offense (§304A in their legislation, BPC1860 and IPC1860),
though punishments differ.105 Therefore, the discussion of elements
from one of them covers the other as well. §304A of the BPC1860
and IPC1860 inserted in 1870 provides that “[w]hoever causes the
death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not
amounting to culpable homicide [‘culpable homicide’ refer to
general manslaughter defined in §299 of the legislation] shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both” [in
Bangladesh].106 The IPC1860 contains exactly the same provision
with a variation in punishments, which are two years’
imprisonment, or with fine, or with both in India.107 As it appears
in the text of §304A, the constituting elements of MCN in
Bangladesh and India lack precision, compared to those in England
and NSW.108 The elements that can be identified from §304A are:
(a) Actus reus—any rash or negligent act (no mention of
‘omissions’ or the duty of care);
(b) Mens rea—rashness or negligence (degree of negligence
and how to determine it not mentioned);
(c) Causation—the accused’s acts shall cause the death of
the victim (not mentioned whether the sole cause, or a major
or an operating cause).109
Each of these elements is ambiguous, and it would be difficult
to apply them in practice in most cases without proper judicial
interpretation. Making the situation worse, there is a paucity of
interpretations of §304A by the higher judiciary in Bangladesh.
Judicial Commission, Manslaughter, (NSW), https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au
/publications/benchbks/criminal/manslaughter.html [https://perma.cc/G8PE-5VRW].
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With the help of a sitting justice of the Supreme Court, only one
reported case decided in 1969, preceding the country’s
independence from Pakistan in 1971, interpreted §304A. The case
is Rashidullah v. The State110 (not related to food safety). The Court
in this case did not consider the negligent act as it was not relevant;
rather, the Court interpreted the meaning of “rash acts” under
§304A, which will be analyzed in a separate endeavor because this
article is focused solely on MCN.111 The reasons for such a scarcity
of interpretation are mainly public tolerance of negligent fatalities
and the disposal of cases with appeals at the district court levels
because of the low penalties prescribed for the offense. District
Courts belong to the subordinate judiciary and their judgments are
not reported formally. However, a few Indian cases under §304A
are available, which will be relied upon in discussing these
elements.
Notably, the Supreme Court of India (“SCI”) relies on the
English leading cases112 in interpreting the statutory elements of
MCN under §304A of the IPC. It is generally known that the courts
in Bangladesh are often persuaded by legal interpretations of the
higher judiciary of India, particularly where their own interpretation
of a given provision of law either does not exist or does exist but is
not particularly helpful.113
The SCI in Sushil Ansal v. State Through CBI (a case involving
§304A) admits that the common law MCN is comparable with
§304A by stating that “[t]here is no gainsaying that negligence in
order to provide a cause of action to the affected party to sue for
damages is different from negligence which the prosecution would
be required to prove in order to establish a charge of involuntary
manslaughter in England, analogous to what is punishable under
§304A, IPC in India.”114 The Court then clarifies the degree of

110 Rashidullah v. The State, 21 DLR 709 (1969) (Bangl.). Notably, the judgment was
delivered by the High Court of East Pakistan, Dhaka, in 1969 under the PC1860 shortly
before the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971.
111 Id.
112 R v. Adomako [1995] 1 AC (HL) 171 (UK); R v. Bateman [1925] 19 Cr. App. R
[8] (UK); Andrews v DPP [1937] 2 All ER 552 (UK); R v Seymour [1983] 2 All ER 1058
(UK).
113 See State v. Marfoth Ali Shah, 68 DLR 13 (AD) (2016) (Bangl.); Kamruzzaman
v. Government of Bangladesh, 67 DLR 157 (AD) (2015) (Bangl.).
114 Sushil Ansal v. State Through Central Bureau of Investigations, (2014) 6 SCC 1,
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negligence required for §304A, stating that “it is imperative for the
prosecution to establish that the negligence with which the accused
is charged is gross in nature no matter §304A, IPC does not use that
expression.”115 What is gross would depend upon the fact situation
in each case and cannot, therefore, be defined with certitude. 116
Decided cases alone can illustrate what courts have considered to
be gross negligence in a given situation.117
The above assertions of the SCI clearly embrace the common
law principle of grossness for interpretation of the statutory
definition of MCN; however, the Court does not define the phrase
“gross negligence,” which has been left open to court’s discretion
to decide on a case-by-case basis.118 It is not clear as to why the SCI
refrained from adopting its provision from English law about the
foreseeability of risk to prove such negligence, whilst it overtly
mentioned that §304A is analogous to the common law MCN.
There are also other deficiencies in §304A, as will gradually unfold
in the discussions of its elements.
Now each of the five elements of MCN identified above will be
analyzed sequentially to scrutinize the shortcomings in §304A and
to ascertain the requirements in Bangladesh and India in light of the
other two.
A. The Existence of Duty of Care
As mentioned earlier, the existence of a duty of care the
defendant owed the victim is a well-accepted principle of the law of
negligence. In this regard, Lord Hoffmann in SAAMCO v. York
Montagu mentions that “a duty of care . . . does not . . . exist in the
abstract,” it must be owed by one to another person.119 French CJ
of the HCA pronounced in Burns v. The Queen that no liability,
whether civil or criminal, arises at common law for negligence
unless the defendant’s negligent conduct involves a breach of a duty
of care owed to another.120 The existence of duty is therefore the
72-73 (India).
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first and foremost requirement. In this respect, Catherine Elliot
explained that:
When Adomako was first decided the meaning of a duty of
care in this context [of MCN] caused some confusion. It is
now relatively clear that it has its ordinary civil meaning as
developed in the law of negligence. Thus a person owes a
duty of care to another where it is reasonably foreseeable
that their acts or omissions will cause harm to another.121
The U.K. Court of Appeal in R v. Evans (Gemma) asserts that in
any cases where the existence of duty is disputed, it would be
initially the judge’s task to consider, as a matter of law, whether it
was “open to the jury to find that there was a duty of care.”122 The
Court clarified in this case, Evans, that the meaning of duty of care
is a question of law to be determined by the judge, whilst the jury
will decide whether the facts of a given case satisfy that legal
definition.123
Consistently in Australia, the HCA, as well as NSWCCA, held
that before MCN can be established, the prosecution has to prove
that the accused owes a recognized common law legal duty of care
to the deceased, as a member of a class of people who may be
affected by the conduct of the defendant.124 As regards MCN by
negligent omissions, Judge Yeldham in R v. Taktak125 set out that
criminal liability may arise for a breach of duty of care, which was,
amongst other things, imposed by legislation or by contract, or
which arose from a certain status relationship.126 Therefore, it is
clear that the duty of care may also be imposed by methods other
than common law (and a breach thereof may constitute MCN), and
in the absence of a manifestly imposed duty of care by common law
or legislation, courts will determine the existence of such a duty on

121 Catherine Elliott, Liability for Manslaughter by Omission: Don’t Let the Baby
Drown!, 74 J. CRIM. L. 163, 166 (2010).
122 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 650 [45] (UK).
123
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124 Burns v The Queen (2012) HCA 35 at 97 & 107 (Austl.); Lane v. R [2013]
NSWCCA 317 ¶ ¶ 59-62 (Austl.).
125 [1988] 14 NSWLR 226 (Austl.).

R v. Taktak [1988] 14 NSWLR 226, at 243-44 (per Yeldham J) (Austl.) (citing
Jones v. United States 308 F. 2d 307 (1962) (U.S.)).
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a case-by-case basis.127 In the present perspective of food safety,
however, the neighborhood principle imposes a duty of care on
producers, manufacturers, processors and suppliers of foodstuffs (as
actors) not to harm consumers (neighbors), as stated in Donoghue
in which the producer of a ginger beer contaminated with a
decomposed snail was held civilly liable.128
In the absence of a statutory duty of care, a common law duty
exists in common law jurisdictions.129 Courts in Australia and
England apply this general principle (neighborhood principle) in
determining the existence of a duty of care and related liabilities.130
In Zaman, the duty of the restauranteur was “to provide food that
was not harmful to customers who made clear that they have a food
allergy.”131 The prosecution did not have to prove the existence of
a duty of care in Zaman because the defendant accepted the duty;
however, had he not accepted, the Court probably would have
imposed this duty.132 It confirms that proprietors of businesses
providing food or services to the public owe a duty of care to their
consumers and service recipients. Regarding the existence of duty,
Lord MacMillan in Donoghue pronounced:
A person who for gain engages in the business of manufacturing
articles of food and drink intended for consumption by members
of the public in the form in which he issues them is under a duty
to take care in the manufacture of those articles. That duty he
owes to those whom he intends to consume his products.”133
Adding reasons for manufacturer’s duty of care, Lord
MacMillan stated that:
He manufactures his commodities for human consumption;
he intends and contemplates that they shall be consumed. By
reason of that very fact he places himself in a relationship
with all the potential consumers of his commodities, and that

127
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relationship, which he assumes and desires for his own ends,
imposes on him a duty to take care to avoid injuring them.
He owes them a duty not to convert by his own carelessness
an article which he issues to them as wholesome and
innocent into an article which is dangerous to life and
health.134
Therefore, the duty is central to negligence and may exist in
various ways, such as being implied by law, stemming from contract
or certain relationships between the victim and offender, or being
voluntarily assumed.135 Both Zaman (England) and Cittadini
(NSW) expressly required the existence of a duty of care the
defendants owed to the victim.136 However, there is no requirement
to prove that they owed the duty to the victim individually; rather,
it would suffice if the duty was owed to the class of people to whom
the victim belongs.137 The above-cited authorities demonstrate that
the existence of duty is explicitly required in both England and
NSW, whilst §304A (Bangladesh and India) is silent about this.
However, in the context of Bangladesh, §304A arguably implies
this requirement because there cannot be an offense committed by
negligent conduct of anyone unless the alleged offenders breach
their duty of care.138 The SCI in Sushil Ansal in 2014 notes that
IPC1860 does not define the word negligence; however, “that has
not deterred the Courts from giving what has been widely
acknowledged as a reasonably acceptable meaning to the term.”139
More clearly, the SCI stipulates that the existence of a duty of care
is “the first and most fundamental of ingredients in any civil or
criminal action brought on the basis of negligence,” and the other
two ingredients are breach of the duty and the consequences
thereof.140 The SCI further recognizes the duty of care imposed by
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both common law and legislation,141 and the SCI in Sushil Ansal
categorically noted that the duty of care has to be owed to the
victim.142
Relying on the above-mentioned judicial interpretations of
MCN and the indispensable nature of the existence of a duty of care,
we can draw an inference that the duty is inherently entrenched in
§304A; therefore, it exists in respect to food manufactures,
producers, processors, suppliers and retailers in Bangladesh and
India under the neighborhood principle. Alongside this statutory
duty of care, common law duty under the neighborhood principle
also exists, as the SCI admits. Bangladesh can benefit from these
judicial interpretations. Both the existence and breach of a duty of
care are necessary conditions for holding a person liable.143
Therefore, the prosecution must prove that the defendant has
breached the duty. Consideration of this element follows.
B. The Defendant Negligently Breached the Duty of Care
While a breach is obvious, the degree of negligence is a
determining factor in distinguishing between civil and criminal
liability. Although Lord Atkin in Andrews v. DPP equated
negligence with the omission of a duty to take care in the specific
perspective of negligent driving,144 criminal negligence actually
applies to both actions and omissions. As identified above, the key
difference between civil and criminal negligence is that only
criminal negligence involves the additional requirement that it
involved such a high risk of death or GBH as to merit criminal
punishment.145
Regarding breach, the Court in Kuddus stipulates in a food
safety context that “[i]t is also axiomatic that a working test for
when a duty of care is owed is that you must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbor.”146 As Lord Atkin clarified, the
concept of neighbor is very broad, and includes all persons who may
141

Id. at 52.

142

Id. at 66.
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Kelly v R (1923) 32 CLR 509, 515 (Austl.).
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[1937] AC 576, 581 (UK).
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be affected by the disputed breach of the duty where the defendant
ought to reasonably be able to contemplate them being so
affected.147 Whether the breached duty constitutes criminal
negligence is determined by applying an objective test.148 In
Australia, the Supreme Court of Victoria in Nydam meticulously
defined a breach of the duty of care, requiring the prosecution to
prove MCN.149 As ruled in Nydam, it is sufficient to prove MCN if
the defendant’s conduct constituting the breach, and thereby
causing death of the victim, was grossly negligent and was done
consciously and voluntarily in the absence of any intention to cause
death or GBH.150 These requirements of establishing MCN were
subsequently approved by the HCA in The Queen v. Lavender151
and Burns v. The Queen (both appeals were from NSWCCA).152 As
approved by the HCA, the requirement of the test of breach is to
consider a comparison between the accused person’s conduct and
the conduct of a reasonable person who possesses the same
attributes of the accused (such as the age, experience and
knowledge) in the circumstances in which the accused found
himself, regarding the ordinary firmness of character and strength
of mind which a hypothetical reasonable person has.153 The
knowledge of the accused is relevant in considering the
circumstances in which the hypothetical reasonable person is
placed.154 A breach occurs when the accused’s conduct falls far
below that of the reasonable person.155
The description of the test clearly includes both subjective and

147

Donoghue v Stevenson [2019] All ER Rep 1 at 1 (UK).

148 The Queen v Lavender [2005] HCA 37, 60 (Austl.); Patel v The Queen [2012]
HCA 29, 88 (Austl.).
149 [1977] VR 430 ¶ 445 (Austl.).
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See Burns, (2012) 246 CLR at 8 (Austl.) (quoting R v Holzer, [1968] VR 481, 482
(Vic. Sup. Ct.) (“The test for a dangerous act [is when] ‘the circumstances must be such
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objective elements.156 The HCA in The Queen v. Lavender offered
clarification about the subjectivity in the objective test, which states
that “[i]f there had been some particular fact or circumstance which
the [accused] knew, or thought he knew and which contributed to
that opinion, and the jury had been informed of that, and the counsel
had asked for a direction about it, then it may have been appropriate
to invite the jury to take that into account.”157
The above clarification fortifies the inclusion of subjective
knowledge in the objective test. However, the HCA in Patel v. The
Queen in a MCN context further clarifies the use of special
knowledge of the accused persons as their personal attribute in the
following terms:
There may be cases where the standard to be applied must
take account of special knowledge on the part of a person,
as relevant to how a person with that knowledge would act.
But that is not to use a person’s knowledge to determine
their guilt. A person’s special knowledge may mean that the
standard of conduct expected of them is higher. It is
necessary to add that the appellant’s imputed knowledge of
his limitations cannot, logically, be applied to exculpate him
for the reason that the objective standard to be applied is a
minimum standard, applicable to all persons who profess to
have the skills and competence.158
Furthermore, the NSWSC in R v. Sam (17), while determining the
directions to the jury, adds that in considering the attributes of the
reasonable person, the accused’s personal beliefs, views or attitudes
should be disregarded.159
The above-mentioned judicial assertions neatly explain that the
special knowledge of the accused may be considered to justify a
“higher standard” of conduct expected of a particular accused but
not to exonerate him/her from liability; further, at the same time, the
accused’s imputed knowledge of limitations cannot be applied to
downgrade the objective standard.160
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Patel v The Queen [2012] HCA 29, 90 (internal citation omitted).

159

See R v. Sam [2009] NSWSC 803 ¶ 21 (Austl.).

160

Id.

104

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVII

The test in England is also objective as devised in Adomako161
and applied in Zaman where the trial judge directed the jury, which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.162 Indeed, when Kuddus’ lack
of knowledge regarding Megan’s meal order was considered on
appeal, he was acquitted based on an objective test that a reasonable
restaurateur would not have foreseen an obvious and serious risk of
death of anyone of the class of people having a history of “mild” nut
allergy.163 However, the relevant circumstances or factual matrix
will be taken into consideration in determining the scope of the duty
that has been breached.164
Generally, a food producer or supplier must be reasonably
careful not to serve a customer or consumer any foodstuff that is
harmful to all or any members of the public, and any hidden risk,
such as ingredients that might cause allergic reaction, must be
properly disclosed where relevant.165 In particular, if a customer
makes his/her specific problem known to the supplier, such as
peanut allergies or gluten intolerance, he/she cannot be served any
food containing any of those risky ingredients. Thus, the scope of
duty is “fact specific” and a breach relates to that scope.166
Conceivably, although the breach of this duty has to be proved
objectively in NSW, the test is not purely objective, because its
objectivity has been compromised by adding some subjective
elements of the defendant, making the test effectively hybrid.167

161

[1995] 1 AC (HL) 171 (UK).

162 [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [59]-[60] (UK) (“The judge made it clear that the
requisite standard was an objective one . . . [W]e consider that the jury would have fully
understood that the test was objective, and reasonableness was to be based on the standards
of a competent restauranteur.”).
163 Kuddus, [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [62] (UK) (“Megan’s parents always
understood that her allergies were mild and had never been aware that they might lead to
her death.”).
164 Id. at [39].
165 Id. (“[A] restaurateur must obviously take reasonable steps not to serve food to a
customer that is injurious to all and any members of the public . . . [But] the scope of the
duty owed to members of the class (or subset) of allergy sufferers may well extend to
identifying by warning in a menu or otherwise the presence of such allergens in food with
the request that notice be given to the restaurant if, in a particular case, such an allergen is
likely to cause harm.”).
166 Id. at [40].
167 See Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67 ¶ 14 (Austl.) (“It is [the jury’s] task to
determine . . .whether his actions amounted to negligence based upon . . . [what] a
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However, it is important to note that the compromise in accepting
the subjective attributes does not unduly advantage the defendant.
Like the requirement in England, NSW and India ─ Bangladesh
obviously needs a breach of the duty. However, the test for proving
a breach is somewhat different. §304A of the BPC1860 requires the
defendant to cause death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide.168 There are no
statutory illustrations or sufficient judicial interpretations of “rash
or negligent acts” available in Bangladesh, as mentioned earlier.169
In the absence of such annotations, a close reading of §304A as
quoted previously leads us to identify a few distinctions between
this statutory articulation of MCN and their common law
equivalents in England and NSW.
First, §304A adds ‘rash acts’ in addition to “negligent acts,” 170
whereas “negligent conduct” stands alone in England and NSW.171
Second, §304A does not indicate anything about the degree of
negligence required to commit this offense.172 It may mean to some
people that ordinary negligence may have been criminalized
unfairly, whereas the common law succinctly requires grossly
negligent conduct.173 However, the SCI added this qualification of
grossness for India.
Third, §304A literally makes only “acts” as the conduct element
of this offense and remains silent about “omissions” which is an
obvious part of negligent conduct.174 By contrast, England and
NSW explicitly criminalize both acts and omissions.175 However,
the SCI included “omissions” as well (which will be shown shortly
reasonable person in the position of the accused would have done.”).
168 Bangl. Penal Code, 1860, §304A.
169

Rashidullah, 21 DLR 709 (1969) (Bangl.).

170

See Bangl. Penal Code, 1860, §304A.

171 See Cittadini, [2009] NSWCCA 302 at [29]; see also Adomako [1995] AC (HL)
171 at 9 (UK).
172 See Indian Penal Code, 1860, §304A(a) (requiring “any rash or negligent act”)
(emphasis added).
173 See Bhalachandra Waman Pathe v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 1319
(1968) (India) (“Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable negligent or failure exercise
that reasonable and proper care.”).
174 Citation needed
175 Compare Indian Penal Code §304A(a); Cittadini, [2009] NSWCCA 302 ¶ 29;
Adomako [1995] 1 AC (HL) 171, 9 (UK).
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below).
Fourth, there is no indication of the foreseeability of risks
associated with the negligent acts, which is essential to determine
criminal negligence, whereas England and NSW are both clear
about the relevant risks.176 This loophole in §304A has the potential
to criminalize the act where the defendant foresaw only “simple
injury,” which seems to be overreach of manslaughter liability.177
This view is supported by the fact that a proven foresight of simple
injury eventually resulting in death of the victim does not attract
manslaughter liability in England or NSW.178
Fifth, given the absence of foreseeable risks, §304A also omits
mentioning the applicable test to determine the breach (or the guilt)
of the defendant. This can create further complexity in establishing
the breach. Generally, an objective foresight of a possibility of
causing at least GBH is required to commit MCN.179 §304A is
sharply different from England and NSW, as there is the
foreseeability risk of GBH or death in NSW and only death in
England.180 Hence, based on the above-stated differing points,
§304A of the BPC1860 seems to be deficient in several respects,
and it has the potential of over-criminalization of negligent conduct.
The recipe for such a suspicion is found in the sole case interpreting
§304A from Bangladesh, which is Rashidullah.181 The HCD
interprets the term a “rash act,” but not a “negligent act,” therefore
we are not analyzing this case.182 However, the following
interpretation of the meaning of a “rash act” would be helpful to
substantiate our concern of over-criminalization of negligent
conduct. The Court interpreted:
A rash act means hazarding a dangerous and wanton act with
the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and that it may
176

Citation needed
See Rashidullah, 21 DLR 709 (1969) (describing culpable conduct as “a dangerous
and wanton act . . . that [] may cause injury”) (emphasis added).
178 Kuddus [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [47] (UK) (quoting R v Gurpal Singh [1999]
Crim LR 582 (UK)) (“The circumstances must be such that a reasonably prudent person
would have foreseen a serious and obvious risk not merely of injury or even serious injury
but of death.”).
179 See Cittadini [2009] NSWCCA 302 ¶ ¶ 29, 33 (Austl.).
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cause injury but without any intention to cause injury or
knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality
in such a case lies in running the risk of doing the act with
recklessness or indifference as to the consequence.183
The above interpretation requires subjective knowledge that “it
may cause injury but without any intention to cause injury or
knowledge that it will probably be caused.”184 This is an unusual
test for a manslaughter offense. If the accused knew that the
disputed conduct has the potential to cause injury, and eventually
caused death, on what basis will the accused have the knowledge
that it will “probably” not cause it? The word “probably” means
“more likely than not,” whereas “possibility” refers to “less likely”
to happen.185 The Court appears to have criminalized the subjective
knowledge of the probability of causing “simple injury” for a
serious offense of manslaughter under §304A. So, we have reasons
to argue that this formulation may also extend to “negligence” under
the same section.
The researchers found some interpretations of §304A by Indian
courts. The High Court of Delhi in Sanjeev Nanda v. The State
explains, in relation to “rash act” in §304A, that “the knowledge of
third degree involves death of a person but the offender hopes that
the same would not occur and such type of offense would be the
lowest degree of gross recklessness and may be called a rash act.”186
This is more acceptable and is significantly different from the
above-cited interpretation of the word in Rashidullah. The High
Court of Delhi in Bhalachandra Waman Pathe v. The State of
Maharashtra in 1968 sought to distinguish between “rash” and
“negligent” acts:
In the case of a rash act . . . the criminality lies in running
the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences [death as noted above].
Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or
failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and
precaution to guard against injury either to the public
generally or to an individual in particular, which having
183

Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
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See R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464 (Austl.).
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See id.; See also David Brown ET AL., Criminal Laws 793-796 (7th ed, 2020).

Sanjeev Nanda v. The State of Dehli, Crim. Appeal No. 807 of 2008, decided on
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regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has
arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to
have adopted. Negligence is an omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or doing something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.187
The Court further wrote:
Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that
the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in
circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised
the caution incumbent upon him and if he had he would have
had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the
negligence of the civil duty of circumspection.188
This interpretation includes both “acts” and “omissions” in
negligent conduct, as it should be, though §304A is silent about
omissions.
Regarding the element of breach, the High Court of Delhi in
Sanjeev Nanda requires that in establishing a criminal breach of
negligence under §304A, the prosecution has to prove that it was “a
breach of duty, an act done without due care and caution and
decision in taking precaution.”189 Likewise, summing up such a
breach, the SCI in Sushil Ansal spells out that:
[N]egligence signifies the breach of a duty to do something
which a reasonably prudent man would under the
circumstances have done or doing something which when
judged from reasonably prudent standards should not have
been done. The essence of negligence whether arising from
an act of commission or omission lies in neglect of care
towards a person to whom the defendant or the accused as
the case may be owes a duty of care to prevent damage or
injury to the property or the person of the victim.190
Providing a similar interpretation previously, the SCI in
Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala stated that “[a] negligent act is an
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189 Sanjeev Nanda v. The State of Dehli, Crim. Appeal No. 807 of 2008, decided on
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act done without doing something which a reasonable man guided
upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs would do or act which a prudent or reasonable man
would not do in the circumstances attending it.”191
Relying on the interpretations of negligent breach of §304A by
the Indian higher judiciary,192 we conclude that criminal negligence
under §304A refers to negligent conduct encompassing both acts
and omissions which fall below the standard of care, meaning that
the defendant did something which a reasonable person would not
have done or failed to do something which a reasonable person
would have done in the same circumstances.
Proving a breach of a duty of care generally requires applying
an objective test. However, a distinction can be identified that the
common law principles in England and NSW ordains an objective
test to be applied to establish a breach, attributing the defendant’s
certain subjective elements to the notional reasonable person, which
renders the test hybrid (further discussed below). Yet the
interpretations of §304A make no mention of such imputation.
Instead, the SCI mentions that “which a ‘prudent or reasonable’
person would or would not do.”193 It is not always easy to equate
“prudence” to “reasonableness.” We are of the view that the hybrid
test suggested in common law would provide greater certainty about
the relevant test and thereby proffers better protection to consumers.
This is because the hybrid test works in favor of the victim, in that
the defendant’s knowledge and experience could be used only to
enhance the standard of defendant’s conduct. Therefore, a pure
objective test in Bangladesh and India has the potential to
disadvantage victims. We submit that Bangladesh can follow the
interpretations by the Indian courts, alongside the common law
principles, as persuasive materials.
As we stated earlier, there is a potential of over-criminalization
by §304A, and we argue that criminalization of simple negligence
which falls within the domain of civil law is a criminal law
overreach. It apparently favors victims but may negatively impact
the public perception of justice. Therefore, it needs to be addressed
by either the legislature or the judiciary in Bangladesh. Further, it
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is important to note that when determining a breach of the duty of
care with respect to MCN, defendants cannot rely on the common
law defense of honest and reasonable mistake of fact under common
law principles.194 The available interpretations of § 304A are silent
about this, which should be clarified as well. Furthermore, the issue
of reasonable foreseeability of serious and obvious risk or death or
GBH has to be taken into consideration as an essential element of
breach in question, as we will now discuss.
C. It was Reasonably Foreseeable that the Breach of that
Duty Gave Rise to a Serious and Obvious Risk of Death or
Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH)
The concept of foreseeability is generally relevant to mens rea;
however, it can be considered in deciding causation as well.195 This
is a very critical element in which the English law differs from its
Australian equivalent; the former requires a reasonably foreseeable
risk of “a serious and obvious risk of death,”196 whereas the latter is
satisfied if the risk is one that gives rise to “GBH or death”197 of
anyone to whom the defendant owed the duty of care at the time of
breach. The gravity of risk indicates the rationality of
criminalization of negligence which could otherwise be only a civil
wrong. The Court in Zaman stated that “[i]t is trite law that liability
for gross negligence manslaughter will only arise if there is an
objective foresight of a serious and obvious risk of death.”198 As
reaffirmed in Kuddus, the foreseeability of such a risk will be
determined objectively that “a reasonably prudent person possessed
of the information known to the defendant would have foreseen that
the defendant’s actions or omissions constituting the breach of duty
had exposed the deceased to an “obvious and serious” risk of
death.”199 The test does not seem to be purely objective as it allows

194 Lavender, (2005) 222 CLR at 57–60 (Austl.) (stating that mistake implies an
opinion, which “would be inconsistent with what has been described as the objectivity of
the test for involuntary manslaughter.”).
195 See David Brown ET AL., supra note 195 at 854 (citing Royall v. R (1991) 172
CLR 378 (Austl.)).
196 Kuddus, [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 at 54 (UK).
197

Cittadini, [2009] NSWCCA 302 ¶ ¶ 29 & 33 (Austl.).
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199
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the ascription of a defendant’s knowledge to the hypothetical
reasonable person of the objective test.200 The Court of Appeal in R
v. Rose ruled, in assessing either the foreseeability of risk or the
grossness of the conduct in question, that the test is both objective
and prospective.201 The Court in Kuddus reaffirmed that the
assessment of the foreseeability issue is both objective and
prospective.202 The objective test requires determination of the
issue “according to a reasonable prudent person in the shoes of the
defendant” whilst denoting “it is predicated on the defendant’s
actual knowledge at the time of the breach, and not on knowledge
that he or she could, or should, have had.”203 As regards actual
subjective knowledge (as opposed to objectively assumed
knowledge) with respect to foreseeability of risk for the purposes of
MCN, Zaman is comparable to Rashid (manager in Kuddus) who
did not appeal against his conviction. They both were aware of their
respective orders and associated risks.204
Similar to the common law of Australia, which allows this
attribution to determine the high standard of the defendant’s
conduct but not to exculpate him/her from the liability, the English
Court of Appeal in Rose provides that it is untenable where the
defense argues that the cause of breach was a defendant’s lack of
foresight of serious risk of death,205 and this decision, Rose, was
carried over to limit the imputed foresight of the hypothetical
reasonable and prudent person in the defendant’s position.”206 The
obviousness and seriousness of the risk are objective facts, which
are not dependent upon the state of mind or knowledge of the
defendant.207 If there is a real issue as to their existence, each must
be proved by relevant and admissible evidence.208 However, the
Court of Appeal in R v. Gurpal Singh emphasized this test that the
200
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circumstances must be such that a reasonably prudent person would
have foreseen a serious and obvious risk of death and a risk of
injury, even serious injury would not be enough.209
An identical view in favor of a serious risk of death was
expressed in R v. Misra,210 and the England and Wales Court of
Appeal in R v. Rudling further clarified that “a mere possibility that
an assessment might reveal something life-threatening which is not
the same as an obvious risk of death. An obvious risk of death is a
present risk which is clear.”211 The English test is drawn from
Adomako, in which it was held that once the breach of duty is
established, the next issue is to consider whether the breach should
be characterized as gross negligence warranting criminal penalty.
The House of Lords states that “[t]he essence of the matter which is
supremely a jury question is whether having regard to the risk of
death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the
circumstances as to amount in their judgment to a criminal act or
omission.”212
The foregoing discussion reinforces previous conclusions with
further substantiation that the degree of negligence required to
constitute MCN is very high, and the gravity of risk is very serious.
The test to establish the foresight of risk is objective and the
defendant’s actual knowledge of the relevant circumstances can be
taken into consideration to enhance the standard of care of the
defendant, but not to lower the standard that may lead to acquittal.
This provision is common in both England and NSW.213 However,
a sharp contrast exists between them with respect to potential
consequence, where England accepts only the risk of death but
NSW extends the risk of causing either death or GBH.
To the contrary, §304A in both India and Bangladesh adopts a
more flexible approach to criminalizing negligent conduct, in that it
would suffice if the conduct had the potential to cause even a
“simple injury” but eventually ended up causing death of the victim.
This creates a significant difference between the laws of England
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and NSW and those of Bangladesh and India.
Further, the degree of negligence must be very high (to be
discussed shortly below) in both England and NSW. But no such
succinct ruling is found in judicial interpretations of §304A,
connecting with the consequence, “gross” is mentioned by the
SCI.214 Therefore, ambiguities exist in relation to both the required
degree of negligence in connection with the required consequence
and the applicable test to establish criminal negligence.
Although all of the four jurisdictions belong to the common law
family, significant differences persist between their laws on
foreseeable consequences and the objectivity of the test to be
applied to determine the foresight of the risks involved. After the
determination of foreseeability of risks, MCN requires
consideration of causation of the death in question.
D. Causation ─the Breach of the Duty of Care that Caused
the Victim’s Death
Causation is a crucial consideration in all four jurisdictions at
hand. With respect to causation, Lord Hoffmann in SAAMCO
pronounced that a plaintiff suing for the enforcement of the duty of
care must prove more than the defendant’s failure to comply with
the duty.215 The Court of Appeal in Zaman distinguishes between
“factual causation” and “legal causation,” and declares that the
factual cause was not an issue.216 The Court considered the
confirmation given in Adomako that “the prosecution is also obliged
to prove legal causation, i.e. that the appellant’s breach of duty
caused or made a significant contribution to the death” of the
deceased.217 The cause needs to be “a” cause, rather than “the”
cause of the victim’s death, as Lords Hughes and Toulson
underscored in R v. Hughes “[w]here there are multiple legally
effective causes . . . it suffices if the act or omission under
consideration is a significant (or substantial) cause, in the sense that
it is not de minimis or minimal.218 It need not be the only or the

214 See Sushil Ansal v. State, (2014) 6 SCC at 66 (India) (offering no clear definition
of degree of conduct required for gross negligence).
215 See [1996] 3 All ER 370 (UK).
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principal cause.219 It must, however, be a cause which is more than
de minimis, more than minimal.”220
If the chain of causation is broken, the conduct of the defendant
can still be accepted as satisfying the requirement of being an
“operating and substantial cause” where it seems to the court that
“if at the time of death the original wound is still an operating cause
and a substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the
result of the wound, albeit that some other cause of death is also
operating.”221 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal in Kuddus applied
this test and held that there must be a causal link between the
victim’s death and the defendant’s breach of duty, and the breach
need not be the sole, but a significant cause.222
The causation test in both England and Australia are identical.
The NSWSC in Justins v. R223 and the HCA in Lane v. R224
underlined the requirement that the defendant’s negligent conduct
causes the victim’s death. However, in the cases where it may not
be very clear whether the defendant’s action or omission caused the
death, it will suffice if the disputed conduct constitutes one cause,
rather than “the sole cause.”225 Further, where more than one cause
is present, common law principles require that consideration be
given to the determination of whether the accused’s negligent
conduct was an “operating and substantial” cause of the deceased’s
death.226 The NSWCCA held in R v. Andrew that the prosecution
need not prove that the accused’s act was the principal cause.227 The
Court further added that it is a question of fact as to whether
defendant’s conduct caused the death of the victim,228 as is the
identification of the conduct causing the death in question, as held
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226 See Royall v The Queen [1991] HCA 27 (Austl.); see also R v Lam & Ors [2008]
185 A Crim R 453, at 64–65 (Austl.).
227 See [2000] NSWCCA 310, at 60 (Austl.).
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by the NSWCCA in R v. Katarzynski.229
Unlike England and NSW laws, Indian law requires death to be
the “direct result” of the accused’s negligent conduct. The SCI in
Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, adopted an old
judicial decision, Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap,230 as “the true
legal position.” It reads:
To impose criminal liability under §304A . . . it is necessary
that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and
negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the
proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of
another’s negligence. It must be the cause causans, it is not
enough that it may have been the cause sine qua non.231
The SCI quoted the meaning of “cause causans” (causa causans)
from the Advance Law Lexicon edited by Justice Chandrachud
(former Chief Justice of India) as being “the immediate cause, as
opposed to a remote cause; the last link in the chain of causation;
the real effective cause of damage,”232 and the meaning of
“proximate cause” was adopted from Black’s Law Dictionary which
states that it is the cause “which in a natural and continuous
sequence unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces
injury and without which the result would not have occurred.”233
This significantly differs from the causation requirements in
England and NSW. The higher requirement under §304A as
interpreted above would arguably operate in favor of the defendant,
which seems to frustrate the social expectation of justice, as seen in
the following outcomes of an appeal.234
The SCI on appeal in Suleman Rehiman Mulani set aside
conviction of manslaughter under §304A and acquitted the accused
who seriously injured the victim while driving a jeep with a “learner
license” without being accompanied by a qualified license holder,
also known as a trainer.235 The driver along with his passenger of
229
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232 Sushil Ansal, (2014) 6 SCC at 80 (India).
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the same jeep pulled the injured into the same vehicle in order to
take him to a hospital, but the victim died on the way.236 The
appellant driver was convicted by the trial court under §304A.237
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Sessions Judge in
appeal as well as by the State High Court in revision.238 However,
on final appeal, the SCI held that there was no evidence that the
appellant driver was responsible for the accident; therefore, the
conviction was quashed.239 The SCI emphasized that the conviction
under §304A requires the prosecution to prove that the death must
have been caused by the accused’s rash or negligent act.240 The
Court added that there must be “direct nexus” between the death of
a person and the disputed act of the accused.241 To substantiate its
decision, the SCI emphasized two points. The victim was taken to
a hospital, a doctor of which refused to treat and called it a “medicolegal case” and advised the accused to take the victim to a
government dispensary – the victim died on the way.242 The SCI
held that there was no evidence to find out the circumstances under
which the accident took place, and the prosecution needed to prove
that the accused’s negligent act caused the death, but they could not
do so.243 Notably, the Court did not find the circumstances in which
the fatal accident occurred, so the defendant could not be held liable,
but it appears that the Court did not ask itself why the victim was
taken to the hospital.244 The answer would be certainly for the
accident. Then the accident was obviously at least a significant and
an operating cause which would be sufficient to punish the
defendant in both England and NSW.245
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Similarly, the SCI acquitted the defendants in Ambalal D. Bhatt
v. The State of Gujarat, a case involving adulteration of a solution
of glucose in normal saline. This solution contained more than the
permitted quantity of lead nitrate, resulting in the deaths of 13
people who were administered the drug.246 In this case, the trial
court convicted the accused, a Chemist In-Charge of the Injection
Department of Sanitax Chemical industries Ltd, under §304A.247
The first appeal was lodged with the Additional Sessions Judge who
acquitted the appellant of the offenses, then the prosecution
appealed against the acquittal to the Gujrat High Court, which
convicted the appellant again.248 The appellant lawyer claimed with
respect to causation that:
Inasmuch as in all cases [sic] under Section 304A there is a
casual chain which consists of many links, it is only that
which contributes to the cause of all causes, namely, the
causa causans and not causa sine qua non which fixes the
culpability. In other words, it is submitted that it is not
enough for the prosecution to show that the appellant’s
action was one of the causes of death. It must show that it is
the direct consequence, which in this case has not been
established.249
To counter the defense lawyer, the State prosecutor argued that
the appellant had negligently failed to comply with the relevant
rules and the death in question was the direct consequence of that
negligence.250 The SCI accepted the prosecution’s arguments,
however and asserted that:
the mere fact that an accused contravenes certain rules or
regulations in the doing of an act which causes death of another,
does not establish that the death was the result of a rash or
negligent act or that any such act was the proximate and efficient
cause of the death.251
The Court then considered “whether the appellant’s act is the
contribution to the death” of the victim).
246 (1972) 3 SCC 525, [1] (India).
247
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direct result of a rash and the negligent act and that act was the
proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s
negligence.”252 Again, referring to a case from 1902, Omkar
Rampratap,253 the SCI asserted that the act of causing the deaths in
question “must be the cause causans; It is not enough that it may
have been the causa sine qua non.”254 Accordingly, the Court held
that accused’s negligent act was a cause, but not “cause causans,”
and there were intermediate causes, so the defendant was
acquitted.255 The SCI also took the same approach in acquitting
accused persons previously.256
In the absence of available judicial interpretations of §304A by
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, we tend to consider that the
courts in Bangladesh are likely to concur with the causation
requirements set forth by the Indian highest court.257 The
differences shown above are substantial for the outcome of a
prosecution, and arguably, they favor the defendants unduly.
Therefore, the courts of both India and Bangladesh need to pay heed
to the interpretations of causation by their counterparts in England
and NSW as presented above.258 Such a revisit to the decisions of
the SCI is desirable to deliver justice, create deterrence and maintain
public confidence in the judicial system.
Even though it is proven that the conduct of the defendant has
caused the victim’s death in a given case, the offense cannot be a
MCN unless the degree of negligence merits criminal penalties, as
explained below.
E. The Circumstances of the Breach were so Bad and so
Reprehensible as to Justify the Conclusion that it
Amounted to Gross Negligence and Required Criminal
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Sanction
Only gross negligence can create criminal liability, as we have
discussed with previous elements.259 Therefore, the degree of
negligence is a decisive factor. Gross negligence is the mens rea of
MCN. In explaining to jurors the appropriate test “to determine
whether the negligence, in the particular case, amounted or did not
amount to a crime, judges have used many epithets, such as
‘culpable,’ ‘criminal,’ ‘gross,’ ‘wicked,’ ‘clear,’ or ‘complete.’”260
The House of Lords in Adomako then added:
[W]hatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or
not, in order to establish criminal liability, the facts must be such
that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused
went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects
and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to
amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving
punishment.261
Both England and NSW require grossly negligent conduct to
commit MCN, as mentioned earlier.262 In this respect, the House of
Lords in Adomako held that it is the grossness in negligence which
makes the conduct criminal, and whether the negligence is gross is
a question of fact.263 In England, the trier of facts needs to be sure
that the accused’s conduct is “truly exceptionally bad,”
demonstrating such a departure from the proper conduct of a
reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances as to be regarded
reprehensible, and properly characterized as gross or criminal
negligence.264 Similarly, the common law of Australia requires that
the negligent conduct be grossly or wickedly negligent.265 Although
an objective test applies to determine the nature of negligent, as
alluded to earlier, the objective test is significantly influenced by the
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264 R v. Kuddus [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [56] (UK); see e.g., R v. Adomako [1995]
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same subjective attributes of the defendant to upgrade the standard
of conduct in common law.
In Zaman, the accused was not aware of the declared allergy of
the victim, nor did he prepare any part of the deceased’s meal.
Nevertheless, he was convicted, even though he was a man of good
character.266 The conviction and sentence were justified by arguing
that Zaman: (i) was negligent in imparting relevant training to their
employees;267 (ii) was “secretly” using materials for saving money
that had the potential to harm some customers (though not all);268
and (iii) used the materials that cause death of a person who declared
his problem with those ingredients.269 Putting all these failures
together, the court found Zaman’s personal gross negligence in
breaching the duty of care owed to the victim.270 It was so because
Zaman had “accepted that he knew that customers with a peanut
allergy were at risk of fatal consequences if they ingested peanut”
and had “conceded that there was a serious and obvious risk of
death” in relation to the deceased.271
As shown above, and as similar to the position in the United
Kingdom, Australian common law also requires the negligence to
be gross or wicked.272 The New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal (“NSWCCA”) highlighted the significance of the degree of
negligence required to commit MCN in The Queen v. Lavender and
mentioned that the negligence has to be of a high degree which
merits criminal punishment.273 The HCA also approved the word
“wicked” alongside “gross” to be used to characterize the required
degree of negligence.274 However, the term “wickedness” was not
a constituent element of the offense; it “was simply an epithet
designed to bring home to the jury in a colorful way the very high
test to be met by the Crown” as explained by the Supreme Court of
266
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NSW in R v. Sood (Ruling No 3).275 Whether the negligence was
gross or wicked is a question of fact, and it must be proved by
applying an objective test placing the reasonable person in the
defendant’s position.276 To minimize the impact of the accused’s
subjective attributes in establishing the grossness, the HCA adopted
the view of the House of Lords that the Crown is not required to
prove the accused’s subjective appreciation that “he was being
negligent or that he was being negligent to such a high degree.”277
The HCA in R v. Lavender implicitly approved the trial judge’s
direction to the jury to consider the reaction of “a reasonable person
in the position of the accused:”
[A] reasonable person who possesses the same personal
attributes as the accused, that is to say a person of the same
age, having the same experience and knowledge as the
accused and the circumstances in which he found himself,
and having the ordinary fortitude and strength of mind
which a reasonable person would have, and determine on
that basis whether the Crown has made out its case.278
To conclude, the test to establish “gross” negligence is not
purely objective, but hybrid with a limited consideration of the
accused’s subjective attributes.279 It is a similar test as applicable to
determine the foreseeability of risks in both England and NSW.280
The SCI expressed an identical view about such grossness in
several cases when it ruled that conviction under §304A essentially
requires grossly negligent of the accused, even though the statutory
provisions do not use this expression.281 The SCI in Sushil Ansal
adopted its pervious interpretation of §304A and stated that:
For negligence to amount to an offense, the element of mens
275 [2006] NSWSC 762 [53] (per Simpson J) (Austl.); David Brown ET AL., supra note
182, at 822.
276 See Lavender, (2005) 222 CLR 67 at 59 (Austl.); see also R v. Taktak (1988) 14
NSWLR 226, 243-244 (Austl.).
277 Lavender, (2005) 222 CLR 67 at 14 (Austl.).
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281 See e.g., Sushil Ansal v. State Through Central Bureau of Investigations, (2014) 6
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Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1 (India).
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rea must be shown to exist. For an act to amount to criminal
negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher
i.e. gross or of a very high degree . . . The word gross has
not been used in Section 304-A IPC, yet it is settled that in
criminal law negligence . . . to be so held, must be of such a
high degree as to be gross. The expression rash or negligent
act as occurring in Section 304-A IPC has to be read as
qualified by the word grossly.282
Although the SCI repeatedly states the requirement of
grossness, it does not define “gross negligence,” nor did it set forth
an appropriate test to determine the grossness. Instead, the Court
left this to the discretion of lower courts to decide on a case-by-case
basis.283
The above discussion reinforces the need for the very high
degree of negligence that must be proven in order to convict an
accused of MCN in all the jurisdictions at hand, except Bangladesh.
The articulation of the common law MCN succinctly includes this
grossness, whilst the judiciary adds this requirement to §304A
through interpretations in India.284 Therefore, based on the
interpretations of the highest court of India, we can conclude that
the word “gross” is inherent in §304A for India.285 Bangladesh as a
separate common law jurisdiction has the liberty to accept or reject
these Indian interpretations. However, we argue that the courts in
Bangladesh should be convincingly persuaded by these widely
accepted annotations to, and qualifications of, §304A in interpreting
this statutory provision.
V. Punishments
Punishment should be sufficient to deter future crime.286 If the
punishment outweighs the benefit of breaching law, people and
businesses are unlikely to care about that law.287 The legislature
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must realize that no scale can truly measure the actual cost of
prematurely losing a human life. Therefore, the prime objective of
law should be to prevent causing that harm. Penalties should be fit
for purpose, reflecting the seriousness of the offense and
incentivizing potential offenders to be deterred.288 We are
concerned about the punishments stipulated under §304A in both
Bangladesh and India. The punishments are a maximum five years
of imprisonment or fine, or both, in Bangladesh, whilst in India the
term of maximum imprisonment is two years, with identical
provisions of fines in both countries.289
We subscribe to the view that the punishment should be
proportionate to the gravity of the offense and the degree of
culpability of the offender.290 We are uncomfortable with the
wording of §304A that killing by doing any rash or negligent act
does not amount to culpable homicide.291 Notably, the offense of
culpable homicide is defined separately in §299 of both the
BPC1860 and IPC1860, which is meant to be a lower degree of
homicide compared to murder defined in §300.292 Culpable
homicide as defined in §299 is approximately equivalent to
common law manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous acts, which
can also be compared with manslaughter by rash acts under
§304A.293 Raising this point, the High Court of Bombay (India)
notes that a plain reading of §304A means that it “completely
excludes culpable homicide” and adds that the act mentioned in this
section “is not at all a culpable homicide.”294 The Court clarifies
that §304A only applies to cases in which the death is caused by

288 See Victoria Roper, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act
2007—A 10-Year Review, 82 J. CRIM. L. 48, 75 (2018) (“[T]he purpose of a fine is to
punish the offender, discourage the offending, and to reflect the seriousness of the
offence.”); David Brown ET. AL., supra note 195, at 823.
289 Bangl. Penal Code, 1860, §304A.
290 See Mirko Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing: Its Justification, Meaning and
Role, 12 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 145 (2000); Austin Lovegrove, Proportionality
Theory, Personal Mitigation, and the People’s Sense of Justice, 69 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 321
(2010).
291 See Indian Penal Code § 304A; Bangl. Penal Code § 304A.
292

See Indian Penal Code § 299; Bangl. Penal Code § 299.
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rash and negligent acts without any intention or knowledge to kill
anyone.295 It means the legislators did not consider “negligent
killings” or killing by rash acts as culpable, probably for which the
punishments are very low. This perception of the offense of MCN
is untenable and does not match with MCN in England and NSW.
In the absence of any specific statutory prescription for punishment,
the Sentencing Council of the United Kingdom mentions in the
current (Sentencing) Guideline that MCN is a serious offense and
the maximum penalty can be life imprisonment. However, the
Guideline suggests a range between one and eighteen years of
custody.296 Fairly similarly, the statutorily prescribed term of
incarceration may be up to twenty-five years in NSW.297
We argue that the lenient concept of the offense in the law
enacted in 1860 is now obsolete, and §304A needs to be amended
by deleting the words “not amounting to culpable homicide” and by
increasing punishments significantly in parallel with England and
NSW. Perhaps because of this downgrading of the offense, the
punishment under §304A remains unreasonably low when
compared to that of the offense under §299 of the BPC and
IPC1860.298 Unlike §304A, §299 only defines culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, and its punishments are stated in §304,
which stipulates the maximum life term imprisonment.299 As per
§57 of the BPC1860, life sentence “shall be reckoned as equivalent
to rigorous imprisonment for thirty years.”300 However, the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh recently
ruled that the life term means thirty years in jail unless “till natural
death” is mentioned.301 Like the definitional similarity, a culpable
homicide under §299 is further comparable with common law
manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous acts in England and NSW
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with respect to punishments as well.302
The preceding analysis of the statutory elements of MCN and
punishments thereof should be helpful in understanding the
comparative standing of the common law MCN and the negligent
homicide under §304A in order to justify the deletion of “not
amounting to culpable homicide” and to increase punishments in
both Bangladesh and India.
VI.

Conclusions
The law of any State should be helpful to ensure good food for
its subjects. Bee Wilson, a reputed analyst of the contemporary
food safety issues, comments that a “good life without good food
should be a logical impossibility.”303 This is in agreement with the
SCI’s view that enactment and enforcement of laws are equally
important, particularly where such laws are concerned with the
safety and security of people and create continuing obligations for
constant attention of those who are entrusted with the responsibility
of administration of those laws in the public interest.304 Law
generally aims to create and maintain social order,305 and food
crimes adversely affect that order by taking away human life and
causing other harm.306 This erodes public confidence in both the
market and the regulatory system. Given the importance of food
safety for human life, the Food and Agriculture Organization
(“FAO”) advocates adopting a “farm to table” approach requiring
regulatory attention to every stage of our food, such as how food is
grown or raised, collected, processed, packaged, sold and
consumed.307
The analysis of the laws of four different jurisdictions carried
out in this essay reveals both similarities and dissimilarities between
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them.
Below is a summary of our major findings with
corresponding recommendations.
a. Similarity and Dissimilarity in Terms of Culpability of the
Conduct
A major similarity is that an individual causing death of another
by criminally negligent conduct can be held liable for unlawful
homicide in common law, called MCN in England and NSW. The
identical codified laws of Bangladesh and India term it causing
death by negligence “not amounting to culpable homicide.”308 The
latter name is flawed in itself in that killing someone should be a
culpable homicide and should be punished accordingly. The
wording of §304A in both Bangladesh and India needs to be revised
and the expression of “not amounting to culpable homicide” should
be deleted in recognition of the actual gravity of the offense.
b. Commonality in Relation to the Required Gravity of
Negligence
As our reasonable inquiries suggest, the word “negligence”
contained in §304A of the BPC1860 has not been the subject of any
judicial interpretation.
However, we have considered its
interpretations proffered by the Indian higher judiciary as it is also
included in the IPC1860.309 Only if the judiciary of Bangladesh
accepts the interpretations of the highest court of India can it be
concluded that the four jurisdictions unanimously require the
conduct causing death must be “grossly negligent.” Otherwise, this
point will only be clarified subsequently following interpretation by
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, which has absolutely no
obligation to embrace others’ interpretations. However, we
recommend adoption of “gross negligence” for § 304A in
Bangladesh in conformity with others.
c. Dissimilarity and Ambiguity with Respect to the
Defendant’s Foreseeability of Risks
Common law principles in both England and NSW are greatly
Compare R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [49] (UK); R v Andrew [2000]
NSWCCA 310 ¶ 60 (Austl.); Indian Penal Code § 304A; Bangl. Penal Code § 304(a).
309 See Ambalal D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, (1972) 3 SCC 525, 8 (India) (requiring
the perpetrator’s “act is the direct result of a rash and negligent act and that act was the
proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence.).
308
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similar except for the defendant’s foreseeability of risks. The
former requires the foreseeability of risk of death of the victim
belonging to a specific class who may be injured by the defendant’s
negligent conduct, whereas the latter extends this risk to both death
or GBH.310 The scope of liability is, therefore, wider in NSW
compared to England. From the perspective of consumer
protection, the provision of NSW is favorable. In sharp contrast,
§304A in India and Bangladesh seems to be excessively generous
in setting the foreseeable risk, as it needs only a risk of “injury,”
typically inclusive of simple injury.311 It seems to be an overreach
of criminal law in criminalizing negligent conduct. We have not
found any credible interpretation of the meaning of injury for §304A
by the courts in Bangladesh or India. The clarity of law is always
necessary for its efficacy and efficient enforcement.312 It is
recommended that the word “injury” be replaced with “death or
grievous bodily harm” in order to make the offense truly criminal
and facilitate its enforcement.313
d. Similarity and Differences Regarding Causation
A significant causation difference exists between the common
law principles and the interpretation of §304A. The causation
requirement is satisfied in both England and NSW if the defendant’s
act or omission was “a cause” or “an operating cause” and need not
be “a major cause,” but it must be more than de minimis.314 By
contrast, as interpreted by the SCI, §304A requires the defendant’s
conduct must be “an immediate and direct cause” (causa causans),
as opposed to “a remote cause.”315 This has the potential to make a
huge difference in favoring defendants unduly in denial of justice

310 See R v. Cittadini [2009] NSWCCA 302, ¶ ¶ 29 & 33 (Austl.); see also R v Kuddus
[2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [54] (UK) (showing that the foreseeability risk of GBH or death
in NSW and only death in England).
311 See Indian Penal Code § 304A; Bangl. Penal Code § 304(a).
312 See S. M. Solaiman, Investor Protection and Judicial Enforcement of Disclosure
Regime in Bangladesh: A Critique, 34 COMMON L.WORLD REV. 229 (2005).
313 See id. at 231 (“Clarity in the law of its purpose and purview, and the efficiency
and honesty of the enforcement institutions are essential for the enforcement of any law.”).
314 See R v. Kuddus [2019] EWCA (Crim) 837 [32]-[34] (UK); see also Lane v The
Queen (2013) 241 A Crim R 321, at 61 (Austl.).
315 Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) 2 SCR 515 (India)
(citing Emperor v Omkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 679 (India)).
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for society, as shown by examples earlier in the analysis. Such a
high requirement can also cause erosion of public confidence in the
judiciary. In the absence of relevant interpretation of the courts in
Bangladesh, reliance is placed upon the SCI. We submit that both
Bangladesh and India should ease the requirement in line with the
common law principles by changing the requirement to “a cause” or
“an operating cause.”
e. Similarity and Ambiguity in Respect of Owing the Duty of
Care
A criminal breach of the duty of care is imperative to constitute
MCN. The provision of owing the duty is, therefore, significant.
The common law principles in both England and NSW are identical
in that there is no need to prove that the duty was owed to the victim
in particular. Instead, the duty must be owed to a class of people in
accordance with the neighborhood principle, and the victim should
belong to that specific class. No interpretation of § 304A is found
properly clarifying this important issue. In Sushil Ansal, the SCI
noted that the duty has to be owed to the victim specifically.316 It
does not correspond to the common law interpretations, and the
English Court of Appeal in Kuddus has effectively negated such a
narrow view by rejecting the first ground of appeal, as alluded to
earlier.317 Our recommendation is that the legislature or the
judiciary in Bangladesh and India clarify the existence of duty of
care in line with the common law principles.
f. Similarities and Dissimilarity with Regard to Conduct
Constituting MCN
The four jurisdictions obviously require the conduct element of
the offense to be “negligence.” However, §304A includes both rash
and negligent acts, and Indian courts have sometimes mixed them
together by using “and” instead of “or” between these different
concepts.318 This conjunctive “and” may have a serious implication

316 Sushil Ansal v. State Through Central Bureau of Investigations, (2014) 6 SCC 1,
66 (India).
317 See Kuddus, [2019] EWCA (Crim) [32]-[34] (UK).
318 See, e.g., Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) SCR 515, at
6 (India); Kurban Hussein Mohammedali v. State of Maharashtra, (1965) SCR 622 (India);
Ambalal D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, (1972) 3 SCC 525, at 8 (India); Salman Salim Khan
v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) SCR 515, at 172 (India).
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for prosecution which may be required to prove that the conduct
constituting MCN satisfies both rashness and negligence. We have
not analyzed the meaning of “rash act,” which falls beyond the
scope of this article. In our understanding, a “rash act” is more
comparable with a reckless act requiring subjective awareness of
potential serious consequence and nonetheless taking the risk with
a belief that the consequence will not eventuate.319 These two
different mens rea elements, one subjective and the other objective,
have been merged under the heading of “causing death by
negligence.”320 However, the text of §304A uses “or,” and the use
of “and” by courts seems erroneous. We recommended that the
“rash act” part be taken away from §304A and be added to §299 of
the BPC1860 and IPC1860, which defines “culpable homicide,”
widely known as general manslaughter.
g. Dissimilarity about Subjectivity in the Objective Test to
Prove Foreseeability of Relevant Risks
How to determine whether a risk associated with a defendant’s
negligent conduct is foreseeable is a serious question. Both England
and NSW commonly follow an objective test with some subjective
elements of the defendant to be attributed to the reasonable person
for the test.321 The test is therefore hybrid in practice. However,
both English and Australian (including NSW) courts ruled that the
subjective elements of the defendant cannot be considered for
lowering the defendant’s standard of care.322 Instead such attributes
can be taken into consideration to enhance the standard of care.323
The use of such subjectivity conforms to strengthening the
protection of consumers. To the contrary, the SCI requires
application of a pure objective test, in avoidance of subjective
elements of the defendant.324 It is suggested that both India and
See Rashidullah v. State, 21 DLR 709 (1969) (Bangl.); Zaburoni v R (2016) 256
CLR 482, at 62 (Austl.); Brown ET AL., supra note 195, at 822.
320 See Indian Penal Code § 304A; Bangl. Penal Code § 304A.
319

321 See R v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67, at 60 (Austl.); R v. Adomako [1995] 1 AC
(HL) 171 (UK).
322 See R v. Zaman [2017] EWCA (Crim) 1783 [49] (UK); Lavender, (2005) 22 CLR
at 67 (Austl.).
323 See Patel v The Queen [2012] HCA 29, at 90 (Austl.); Adomako, [1995] 1 AC
(HL) 171 (UK).
324 See Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 269, 5 (India).
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Bangladesh should revise their requirement and apply a hybrid test
as applicable in England and NSW.
h. Similarity and Dissimilarity Concerning Punishments
Finally, there is an attitudinal similarity, though not parity,
between the maximum punishments of MCN in the U.K. (life term)
and NSW (twenty-five years), implying that both jurisdictions
regard the offense as serious.325 By contrast, the maximum limit in
Bangladesh is five years (changed from two years in 1982), whereas
the term of two years remains unchanged in India to date.326 The
provisions of punishment are further diluted by the options that it
can be only a nominal fine or any amount of fine along with any
term of imprisonment below the prescribed limits in both
Bangladesh and India.327 Hence, the current maximum punishments
in India and Bangladesh are unreasonably low, and the punishments
may be too low to create effective deterrence. Our submission
recommends raising of maximum punishments to twenty-five years
of imprisonment in both Bangladesh and India in similarity with the
other two jurisdictions.
Food fraud is generally a regulatory offense in itself driven by
the desire for increased financial gains and not intended to cause
harm to consumers (if intended to cause harm, it is known as foodterrorism or bioterrorism).328 Such a regulatory offense translates
into food-manslaughter when the offense results in the death of a
consumer. The accused can be simultaneously charged under the
regulatory law for the breach of food safety as well as criminal law
for manslaughter.329
This article discussed the offense’s
manslaughter aspects and found that Bangladeshi and Indian laws
significantly differ from their equivalents in England and NSW,
though all four jurisdictions broadly follow the common law
325 U.K. SENTENCING COUNCIL, Manslaughter – Definitive Guideline (Nov 2018) at 9,
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Manslaughter-definitiveguideline-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFV6-C83U]; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), § 24
(Austl.).
326 See Indian Penal Code § 57; Bangl. Penal Code § 57 (outlining the specifics of
punishment for MCN).
327 See Indian Penal Code § 57; Bangl. Penal Code § 57.
328

See Spink ET AL., supra note 8, at 2708.

See e.g., Zaman, [2017] EWCA (Crim) at [49] (UK); R v. Kuddus [2019] EWCA
(Crim) 837 [56] (UK).
329
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system.
This article also specified several deficiencies in
Bangladeshi and Indian laws in various respects and submitted
specific recommendations to address the shortcomings in light of
the England and NSW counterparts. Given the continued and
unrestrained food safety law violations in both Bangladesh and
India, those countries need to clarify and improve the laws as
recommended above, which includes enhancing punishments for
food-manslaughter under the existing provisions of MCN. We
believe that our findings will benefit India and Bangladesh. Further,
our findings can assist other nations that have similar legislative
provisions for this serious offense and also still follow the Penal
Code 1860 inherited from the British colonial rule, such as Pakistan,
Singapore, and Malaysia.
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